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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------------------------
GEORGE W. FRAME and LORY 
HERBISON FRAME, 
Appellants, 
-vs-
RESIDENCY APPEALS 
) 
COMMITTEE OF UTAH STATE ) 
UNIVERSITY, CLAUDE J. 
OPENSHAW, Chairman, and 
EVAN J. SORENSON, Assistant 
Director of Admissions and ) 
Records, 
) 
Respondents. 
Case No. 18097 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
-----------------------------------------------------------
INTRODUCTION 
This action was filed with the Utah Supreme Court 
seeking judicial review and reversal of the decision of the 
First Judicial District Court, the Honorable VeNoy 
Christofferson, whereby appellants' Motion for Surrunary 
Judgment was denied and respondents' Motion for Surrunary 
Judgment was granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants do not agree with the Statement of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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·Facts recited by respondents-in their brief, and refer the 
court to the Statement of Facts as stated in appellants' 
initial brief to the court. 
Appellants specifically wish to point out that 
appellants returned to Utah, after being in Africa, and 
registered at Utah State University in March of 1978, not 
September of 1978 as stated by respondents in their Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP TEST IS NOT 
THE PROPER STANDARD FOR ANALYZING AN 
IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION. 
Appellants' Complaint against respondents for 
refusing to classify them as residents of Utah State 
University (hereinafter "USU") alleges an unconstitutional 
denial of both equal protection and due process. 
Respondents' brief indicates that the only 
relevant standard to be employed by the court in determining 
the constitutionality of Section I. (D) of the Rules and 
Regulations for Determining Resident Status in the Utah 
System of Higher Education (hereinafter the "30-day rule") 
is the rational relationship test. This test is described 
in respondents' brief, at p.12, by quoting a phrase from 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
The quoted from Weber, supra, in respondents' 
brief is clearly limited to constitutional challenges under 
2 
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the Equal Protection Clause. The entire quote from Weber, 
supra, is: 
"The tests to determine the validity of state 
statutes under the Equal Protection Clause have been 
variously expressed, but this court requires, at a minimum, 
that a statutory classification bear some rational 
relationship to a legitimate state purpose". Weber, supra, 
at 172, (emphasis added). 
Appellants agree that the rational relationship 
test is the proper test to be employed by the court in 
regard to their challenge to the 30-day rule under the Equal 
Protection Clause. In addition to their equal protection 
challenge, however, appellants have also challenged the 
30-day rule under the Due Process Clause; they respectfully 
submit that the proper standard to be used by the court for 
analyzing their due process challenge is different from the 
rational relationship test described in Weber, supra. 
As argued in appellants' initial brief to this 
court, the 30-day rule creates an irrebuttable presumption. 
It has long been recognized that an irrebuttable presumption 
is a violation of the Due Process Clause. Cleveland Board 
of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. 
Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645 (1972). 
[I]t is forbidden by the Due Process 
Clause to deny an individual the 
resident rates on the basis of a 
permanent and irrebuttable presumption 
3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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of nonresidence, when that presumption 
is not necessarily or universally true 
in fact, and when the State has 
reasonable alternative means of making 
the crucial determination. Vlandis 
supra, at 452 (emphasis added). 
In analyzing appellants' due process challenge, 
then, it would be improper for the court to use the rational 
relationship test, as advocated by respondents, because that 
is an equal protection standard. Rather, the court must use 
the test enunciated in Stanley, supra, Vlandis, supra, and 
LaFleur, supra. That type of analysis is explained as 
follows in Moreno v. University of Maryland, 420 F. Supp. 
5 4 1 , at 5 5 4 ( D • Md . 19 7 6 ) : 
In this case, then, several questions 
relative to plaintiffs' due process 
claim must be resolved: (1) does the 
University of Maryland's "In-State Policy" 
create an irrebuttable presumption ... (2) 
if so, is that presumption appropriate 
because universally true? (3) if not, 
can the defendants so justify that 
presumption as to save it from 
unconstitutionality? 
By using the correct test for appellants' due 
process challenge to the 30-day rule, the only appropriate 
conclusion is that the 30-day rule creates an irrebuttable 
presumption which is an unconstitutional violation of the 
Due Process Clause. See Point I, Brief of Appellants. 
4 
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POINT II. 
THE 30-DAY RULE IS NOT RATIONALLY 
RELATED TO A LEGITIMATE STATE 
PURPOSE. 
In the area of social welfare and econom1cs, the 
proper test for judging an equal protection challenge to a 
statute or regulation is whether the classification 1s 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). This, then, 1s 
the standard to be applied here to appellants' equal 
protection challenge to the 30-day rule, although it 1s not 
the proper standard for their due process challenge. 
Even given this minimal equal protection standard, 
the 30-day rule fails to pass constitutional muster. 
Appellants recognize that it is legitimate for respondents 
to differentiate between resident and non-resident tuition 
at USU. The 30-day rule, however, must fall under an equal 
protection challenge because the rule is so unreasonable and 
so senseless that it is not even rationally related to 
respondents' purpose of maintaining the tuition 
differentiation. 
In order to prevent non-residents from taking 
advantage of the lower resident tuition, respondents require 
a person who comes to Utah for the primary purpose of 
attending an institution of higher education to reside in 
Utah for a least one year before he/she can possibly be 
5 
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considered a resident for tuition purposes. Appellants do 
not challenge the reasonableness of such a rule. 
Appellants do, however, contend that it is totally 
unreasonable for respondents to impose the additional 
requirement on applicants for resident status that, during 
that one year, they be absolutely precluded from being 
physically absent from the State for more than 30 days. 
There is no reason to assume that a person who 
leaves the State for more than 30 days is not a resident. 
Possible legitimate reasons for such absences include 
temporary employment, research related to one's studies, 
participation in special educational programs offered only 
in other states, or joining a branch of the military. All 
of these examples show legitimate reasons why a Utah 
resident might be absent from the State for more than 30 
days and yet still be a bona fide Utah resident. It is not 
only unfair, but totally illogical, to strip all persons who 
leave the State for more than 30 days of resident student 
status. 
The irrationality of the 30-day rule is furthered 
by its irrefutable nature. A student who has not yet been 
in Utah for one year and who has left Utah for more than 30 
days is allowed no opportunity to present evidence that 
his/her absence has not negated his/her residency. 
6 
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This irrationality is evident when one examines 
appellants' situation. The running of the one contir1uous 
year's presence within the State has been broken by their 
summer trips to other parts of the country. These trips 
have been for one or both of two purposes - studi~s and 
employment. 
·Both appellants are in the field of wildlife 
science. Because of the fact that certain kinds of wildlife 
exist only in certain areas of the country or the world, 
appellants have found it necessary to travel to places such 
as Africa and New Jersey to do the research required for 
their studies. Yet this necessity has automatically 
deprived them of any chance to attain resident student 
status. 
Appellants' trips out-of-state were also, at 
times, for the purpose of employment. They were engaged, at 
various times, in doing slide shows and lectures about their 
studies, and in researching and writing articles on wildlife 
for a children's magazine. 
The 30-day rule specifically mentions employment 
out-of-state as being an indicia of non-residence. Such an 
assumption is absurd. Many students take surruner jobs, if 
possible, to help defray the costs of their educations. 
Those students, especially graduate level students often 
attempt to find employment in their area of study even if 
7 
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- i 
they must go to a different state for that employment; they 
.,,_ 
realize that any extra knowledge and experience they gain 
through a summer job in their fields will help them when 
competing for employment once their education is completed. 
To penalize students such as appellants for trying to help 
:u-;,·1b themselves in this way is certainly irrational. 
POINT III. 
NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXISTS TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT APPELLANTS 
ARE NOT RESIDENTS. 
Respondents, in the brief, argue that substantial 
evidence existed to support their administrative decision in 
which they denied appellants' applications for resident 
status. Therefore, respondents argue, their decision was 
not arbitrary and capricious. 
Appellants respectfully submit that respondents' 
decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that 
it was, indeed, arbitrary and capricious. See Point III, 
Appellants' Brief. 
In their brief, respondents also cite the case of 
Michelson v. Cox, 476 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D. Iowa 1979), and 
argue that Michelson and the present case are substantially 
alike, and that this court should, like the Michelson court, 
affirm the administrative finding of non-residency. 
The Michelson case, supra, is easily 
distinguishable from the case at bar here. In Michelson, 
8 
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the presumption of non-residency was reb:1tt;ible, capable of 
being over~ome; on the other hand, the presumµtion of 
non-residency created by the 30-day rule in the present cdse 
is not rebuttable. This major difference distinguishes 
Michelson significantly from the present case. Appellants, 
therefore, respectfully submit that the Michelson case is 
not relevant to the court's decision in the present case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully submit that the decision 
below should be reversed and appellants be granted the 
relief requested in their brief. 
DATED this 2.;~ days of November, 1982. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorney for Appellants 
J 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the above REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to Michael 
Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for Respondents, 
President's Office, Old Main, Room 116, U.M.C. 14, Uta~ 
State University, Logan Utah, via first class U.S. Mail, 
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~kDA TAYLOR 
Secretary 
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